The authors examine the growth and survival of international joint ventures (IJVs
to a wholly owned subsidiary, an IJV enjoys a reduced level of foreignness and a higher level of local legitimacy because of its status as partly a child organization of a local firm. Local institutional constituents may perceive the IJV to be in a morally favored taxonomic category (i.e., being local) and thus worth their support (Suchman, 1995; Zucker, 1986 ). An IJV may enjoy such structural legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) based on the legitimacy of a "similar" organization, namely, its local parent. In other words, the legitimacy and reputation of the local parent will spill over to the IJV (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Yiu & Makino, 2002) . A local parent with higher legitimacy can enhance the external legitimacy of its IJVs as a result of this legitimation process.
In the literature, firm age is an important contributing factor to external legitimacy. Research has shown that increased organizational age leads to higher survival rate, whereas young organizations generally suffer from a liability of newness (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986) . Underlying this liability of newness is a young firm's lack of social approval, constituent endorsement, and external legitimacy that come only after years of experience in providing certain products or services (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Stinchcombe, 1965) . Over time, the firm may become increasingly accepted by, and isomorphic with, the local institutions through economic exchanges and social interactions with other organizations in the environment, thus obtaining cognitive or taken-for-granted external legitimacy (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Shane & Foo, 1999; Suchman, 1995) . Regardless of its sources, the legitimacy associated with a local firm will spill over to its subsidiary in the same environment, which in turn should enhance the latter's growth and survival chances. Thus, we posit the following:
Hypothesis 1: The age of the local parent has a positive effect on IJV growth and survival.
Firm size is another important contributing factor to external legitimacy. As with studies on organizational age, research has shown that increased organizational size leads to higher survival rate, whereas small firms confront a liability of smallness that leads to higher organizational mortality rates (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Singh et al., 1986) . Large size tends to legitimate organizations, to the extent that it is interpreted by external stakeholders as an outcome of an organization's prior success and accumulated reputation, trustworthiness, and prestige (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Staw & Epstein, 2000) . Thus, larger firms also enjoy cognitive, taken-for-granted external legitimacy (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Shane & Foo, 1999) .
Business connections with large firms-in the form of either one-time business transactions or long-term partnerships-are likely to enhance the legitimacy of transacting parties (Barringer & Harrison, 2000) . In a similar vein, having a large local firm as a partner in the joint venture arrangement helps the IJV shorten the time it takes to establish legitimacy in the local environment. The attainment of local legitimacy will, in turn, make it easier for the IJV to obtain financial and human resources in local markets and develop networks with local suppliers and buyers (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) . All of these benefits related to the acquisition of local legitimacy through partnering with a large local firm should enhance the growth and survival of an IJV. Thus, Hypothesis 2: The size of the local parent has a positive effect on IJV growth and survival.
Industry Relatedness and Internal Legitimacy
The requirement of internal legitimacy reflects the need of a subsidiary for resources from, and coordination by, the parent firm and other subunits in the multinational firm system. Needless to say, a subsidiary receives invested resources from its parent firm to start with. It also requires, more or less, continued support from its parent for sustained growth and long-term survival. This is where its competitive advantage lies-at least partly (Zaheer, 1995) . Although all subsidiaries may be seen as "legitimate" in the eyes of the parent firm, one can reasonably argue that resource scarcity and strategic priority considerations will prompt the parent firm to provide more resources and support for the more "legitimate" subunits.
Internal legitimacy can be a result of replication of organizational structure (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991) . When firms establish their overseas subunits, there is a tendency for them to replicate their existing organizational features and practices in order to deal with uncertainty in the host market (Lu, 2002) . Subsidiaries may also replicate parent structures to facilitate exchanges of inputs and outputs with the parent firm (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994) . Compared to subsidiaries that are more locally oriented and thus more reliant on external legitimacy for their survival, these more internally oriented subsidiaries are usually under more direct control and integration by the parent firm (Hillman & Wan, 2005) . As a result, parent firm practices are more easily institutionalized in the subunits that are more closely connected to the parent firm (Kostova, 1999 ).
An important factor that increases the connectedness between a subsidiary and its parent firm is their industry relatedness. Industry relatedness is an important channel for transferring competencies, technologies, and routines from the parent firm to an IJV (Luo, 1997 (Luo, , 2002 . Subsidiaries that operate in the same industry segments of the parent firm enjoy an advantage over industry-unrelated subsidiaries in terms of resource match and industry-specific knowledge (Chang, 1996; Li, 1995) . This suggests that industry-related IJVs are more isomorphic with parent firm practices and procedures as a result of their dependence on the parent (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002) . It also implies that industry-related IJVs are more similar to the parent firm in structure because, conceivably, resource and knowledge transfers will be more efficient when the recipient unit replicates the structure of the originating unit. Thus, industry-related IJVs are likely to enjoy both "procedural" (i.e., resulting from accepted procedures and techniques) and structural legitimacy internally (Suchman, 1995) .
Hypothesis 3: Industry relatedness of an IJV to its foreign parent has a positive effect on IJV growth and survival. Hypothesis 4: Industry relatedness of an IJV to its local parent has a positive effect on IJV growth and survival.
Industry Relatedness and External Legitimacy
The literature has long recognized the industry-broadly or narrowly defined-as a channel for transporting legitimacy. An industry can be a source of legitimacy from which its members will benefit or suffer (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zucker, 1988 ). An individual firm can also confer legitimacy on similar firms within or entering the same industry (Haveman, 1993) . Whatever credentials and reputation a local firm has, such legitimacy has the highest value when it is within the same context. Thus, a subsidiary that is not only created by a legitimate firm but also operates in the same industry segment as its creator is more likely to have legitimacy than its sister subsidiaries outside the parent's industry and than firms in the same industry that are not linked to a legitimate organization in any way.
Following this logic, we expect a positive interaction between an IJV's industry relatedness to its local parent and its external legitimacy springing from the same parent. Because industry relatedness has been associated with internal legitimacy, external legitimacy of the local parent will more easily spill over to an IJV when the IJV has internal legitimacy with the local parent.
Hypothesis 5: Industry relatedness of an IJV to the local parent strengthens the positive effect of local parent age on IJV growth and survival. Hypothesis 6: Industry relatedness of an IJV to the local parent strengthens the positive effect of local parent size on IJV growth and survival.
Dual Industry Relatedness and Internal Legitimacy
Research on the legitimacy of multinational firms suggests that obtaining external legitimacy and maintaining internal legitimacy within the multinational firm system simultaneously are not easy tasks (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) . Subsidiaries of a multinational firm are situated in dual institutional environments (host-and home-country institutions) and under dual isomorphic pressures from these environments for conformity (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Westney, 1993) . Local institutions and home-country institutions represent two different sets of legitimacy rules and norms. They may place conflicting legitimacy requirements on the subsidiary, especially when there is a large institutional distance between the host and home countries (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002) . Even if two nations' institutions are similar to each other, there are always aspects of the institutional environment that make them different to some extent-including, for example, political and economic systems (regulative institutions) and cultures (normative institutions), which constitute some basis for the prevailing rules and norms (Hofstede, 1980; North, 1990) . Thus, conformity to, and legitimacy from, one of these two institutions may imply inconsistency and lack of legitimacy with the other. What extant research has not discussed, however, is the added complexity of a foreign subsidiary being an IJV, in which case the local parent is a part of the local institutions.
Although industry relatedness to a parent firm is a source of internal legitimacy with that parent, dual relatedness to both parents does not necessarily bring dual legitimacy benefits. On the contrary, given that industry relatedness is associated with the replication of structures and processes, as discussed earlier, dual industry relatedness may involve the difficult task of integrating incompatible structures and processes of the two parents, and the underlying conflicting institutional rules and legitimacy norms of the host and home institutions. An IJV that is industry related to both parents could face the risk of losing legitimacy with both sides: Both parents may be unsatisfied with the IJV because it has adopted some structures and processes that are in conflict with their own rules and norms. As this happens, the growth and survival of an IJV will be adversely affected. Thus, we posit the following:
Hypothesis 7: Industry relatedness of an IJV to one of its parents reduces the positive relationship between industry relatedness of the IJV to the other parent, on one hand, and IJV growth and survival on the other hand.
Method

Sample and Data Sources
For the implementation of our investigation, we used a sample of Japanese IJVs in China. The sample represents a history of Japanese IJVs in China formed during the period 1981-1999. This empirical setting is appropriate for the test of our theoretical framework because of the prominent role of Japanese IJVs in China and because of the significant differences between the institutional environments of Japan and those of China. With the increasing importance of the Chinese market in the world economy, China has become one of the most popular host sites for foreign direct investments (FDIs) worldwide, including those from Japan. The country has been home to 40% of Japan's annual outflows of foreign investment since 1996, and 70% of Japanese FDIs in China are established as joint ventures with Chinese firms (Beamish, Delios, & Lecraw, 1997; Lu, 2000) . In addition, there are significant differences in the institutional environments in which Japanese and Chinese firms are embedded, one being a developed country, the other an emerging market, respectively. The differences between foreign and local institutions-and the difficulty in meeting legitimacy requirements for Japanese subsidiaries in China-present an ideal setting for a study on the role of legitimacy in IJVs.
We collected data on Japanese IJVs in China, and on their Japanese and Chinese parents. The source of information for the FDI of Japanese firms in China is Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran, Kuni-Betsu (Japanese Overseas Investments, by Country). This information is published annually by Toyo Keizai Inc., a large Japanese compiler and publisher of business-level statistical and economic information. The data reported in Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran were based on responses to questionnaires sent to all firms listed on Japanese stock exchanges, as well as to major unlisted firms. The coverage of Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran is close to the population of foreign subsidiaries for Japanese firms that responded to the survey . For this study, we used editions from 1986 to 2001 to develop a longitudinal database of Japanese IJVs in China.
The main source of listed Japanese parent-company information is the Nikkei NEEDS tapes, an electronic database compiled by Nihon Keizai Shinbun-sha, one of the largest compilers and publishers of statistical and corporate information in Japan. This database provides annual financial information on all Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange since 1964. The information on unlisted Japanese parent companies is from the Japanese Accounts and Data on Enterprises (JADE) database, compiled by Teikoku Databank and published by Bureau van Dijk. The coverage of firm-level information of the JADE database is similar to that reported in the Nikkei NEEDs tapes.
We collected information on the Chinese parent firms from Wanfang Data Company (www.wanfangdata.com.cn), a Beijing-based business-and academic-information provider under China's Ministry of Science and Technology. Wanfang's Chinese Enterprises and Companies Database was started in 1988. Its data are included in the DIALOG online systems. These data were collected through multiple means, including mailed questionnaires, telephone surveys, and printed materials, and are updated annually. Research using this data source has appeared in academic journals (Li & Wong, 2003) .
Variables
Dependent variables. The first dependent variable is IJV sales growth. We operationalized this variable as the compound annual sales growth rate of an IJV. We obtained IJV sales information from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran and computed sales growth for each IJV using the following formula:
IJV sales growth = last year sales first year sales
IJV survival is the second dependent variable for this study. We identified exiting subsidiaries by comparing preceding editions of Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran with later editions. The earliest edition we used was 1986, and the latest edition was 2001. Exits were coded as 1, and surviving IJVs were coded as 0. The duration of the IJV was computed as the number of years from foundation to its time of exit, or to 2001. We backtracked the exact exit year by consulting consecutive editions of Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran from 1986 to 2001. The exit year was the year that the joint venture was delisted in the database. Although one could not equate exit completely with failure, one could expect that an IJV would remain in operation as long as it represented the most efficient organization mode (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997) . For instance, a sell-off of the IJV to a third party implies a competitive setback (Park & Russo, 1996; Porter, 1987) . The acquisition of the IJV by one of the partners, according to Kogut (1991) , is related to unexpectedly high growth and industry concentration, which suggests that the original governance form has failed to meet changing conditions. Empirical evidence from prior studies also indicates that survival correlates positively with financial and satisfaction measures of performance (Geringer & Hébert, 1989) .
We found that there were few exits in IJVs founded in the year 1999 or later. To minimize the sample bias toward survivors arising from the "honeymoon effect" (Li, 1995; Park & Russo, 1996) , the sample was restricted to IJVs that were at least 2 years old.
Independent variables. We operationalized the Chinese parent's age as the difference between its founding year and that of its IJV. We measured the size of the Chinese parent by the number of employees at the time of IJV formation. We used logarithm transformation of both variables in our regressions.
Following Li (1995) , we used an indicator variable to indicate whether the three-digit Standard Industrial Codes (SICs) of an IJV's primary industry matched those of its Japanese parent's primary industry at the time of the IJV foundation. If there was an overlap in an IJV and its Japanese parent's three-digit SICs, we assigned a value of 1 to the indicator variable, industry relatedness between the Japanese parent and its IJV (Japanese parent-IJV relatedness).
We also used an indicator variable to indicate whether the three-digit SICs of an IJV's primary industry matched those of its Chinese parent's primary industry at the time of the IJV's foundation. We gave the indicator variable-industry relatedness between the Chinese parent and IJV (Chinese parent-IJV relatedness)-a value of 1 if there was an overlap in their threedigit SICs. We focused on primary industries on our coding of industry relatedness because one could reasonably expect that a firm has its maximum legitimacy in its primary industry rather than secondary industries.
Control variables. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Li, 1995; Luo, 2002) , we included four measures to account for major factors at the IJV level that could affect IJV survival. They are IJV age (measured as the logarithm of years of age), IJV location (a dummy variable that we gave a value of 1 if the IJV was located in either a special economic zone or an open coastal city), IJV size (measured as the logarithm of total number of employees), and the industry in which the IJV operates (a set of industry dummies based on two-digit industry codes). We expected IJV age, location, and size to have positive effects on IJV growth and survival. Control in IJVs is an important factor affecting the survival of foreign subsidiaries (Li, 1995) , although there are conflicting findings on the effect of control on IJV performance. We controlled for the Japanese parent's equity ownership in the IJV, which was measured as equity owned by the Japanese parent as a percentage of total equity in the IJV. We also controlled for Japanese expatriates in the IJV, which we defined as the percentage of Japanese expatriates among IJV employees.
We next calculated two measures to control for factors at the Japanese parent level. We computed the size of the Japanese parent as the logarithm of number of employees. We then controlled for the technological capability of the Japanese parent measured by R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as a percentage of total sales). We expected both to have a positive effect on IJV growth and survival. We further controlled for the type of company at the Chinese parent level. We used an indicator variable to identify whether a Chinese parent is a stated-owned enterprise (SOE). The SOE status has brought about both advantages and disadvantages for Chinese firms (Nee, 1992; Peng & Luo, 2000) . We coded the result 1 if a Chinese parent is state owned.
After matching the parent information with FDI information and deleting cases with missing values, we obtained a sample comprising 291 Sino-Japanese IJVs established in China, 83% of which were in the manufacturing industries.
We estimated two types of models to test our hypotheses. First, we ran an OLS regression analysis on the compound annual growth rate of IJVs. Second, we employed event history analysis to examine the hazard rate of IJV exit. We used exponential model specification because it provided the best fit and had the largest log-likelihood compared with other specifications such as Weibull and log-normal. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for this study's variables. The descriptive statistics show that the exit rate was 12%. About 47 percent of the IJVs in our samples were located in either the special economic zones or open coastal cities. On average, the number of employees was 251 for the IJVs, 10,446 for their Japanese parents, and 13,589 for their Chinese parents. Furthermore, the average equity ownership of Japanese parents was about 55%, and the average of Japanese expatriate employment was 2%. Forty-nine percent of the IJVs were in the same (three-digit SIC) industry as their Japanese parents. In contrast, only 37% of the IJVs were related to their Chinese parents. Finally, 68% of the Chinese parents were state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Results
We tested our hypotheses in two sets of 10 regressions. Because we tested a series of interaction effects, we mean-centered related variables to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. We report the results on IJV growth in Table 2 and display the results on IJV survival in Table  3 . All models were significant. For the interpretation of the results, a positive sign indicates an improvement in IJV sales growth in Table 2 , whereas a hazard ratio lower than 1 suggests an increase in the survival chances of an IJV in Table 3 .
Model 1 in both tables is the baseline model, which only included control variables and the set of industry dummies (not reported in the tables). In Table 2 , Japanese parents' equity ownership in the IJV is the only significant variable. Its positive coefficient estimate indicates that a higher level of equity owned by Japanese parents was associated with a higher rate of IJV sales growth. In Table 3 , three control variables are significant. As expected, IJV sales growth had a positive impact on IJV survival, providing further evidence that IJV exit is often associated with negative economic outcomes such as low sales growth. Meanwhile, IJV age enhanced IJV survival, as did IJV size measured by the number of employees.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 make predictions about the effects of external legitimacy related to local parents. Models 2 and 3 tested these hypotheses by entering the age and size of Chinese parent firms while including all the control variables. The Chinese parent's age had a significant and positive impact on IJV sales growth (p < .05), but it did not have a significant impact on IJV survival. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. In contrast, the Chinese parent's size only had a positive and significant impact on IJV survival (p < .05). Hypothesis 2 was also partially supported.
Model 4 in Tables 2 and 3 tested the main effect of industry relatedness between an IJV and its Japanese parent, as predicted in Hypothesis 3. As shown in Table 2 , Japanese parent-IJV relatedness had a positive and significant impact on IJV sales growth (p < .05). Furthermore, this variable had a value smaller than 1 in Table 3 (p < .10), indicating a positive impact on the survival rates of IJVs. Our Hypothesis 3 received support in both the growth and survival models. Model 5 examined, in turn, the main effect of industry relatedness between an IJV and its Chinese parent, as specified in Hypothesis 4. Chinese parent-IJV relatedness was signed as predicted in both tables, but the effect was only statistically significant in Table 2 (p < .01). Hypothesis 4 was partially supported.
Model 6 entered all four independent variables (Chinese parent age, Chinese parent size, Japanese parent-IJV relatedness, and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness) as the baseline model for Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7. In this full main-effect model, the signs and significance of all four independent variables remained stable, compared with those in Models 2, 3, 4, and 5-confirming the robustness of the results reported in these models.
Model 7 included the interaction term of Chinese parent age and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness to test Hypothesis 5. In a similar manner, Model 8 introduced the interaction term of Chinese parent size and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness to test Hypothesis 6, whereas Model 9 added the interaction term of Japanese parent-IJV relatedness and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness to test Hypothesis 7. To guard against spurious significance of the interaction results, we first checked whether the overall change in the fit of each model was significant, compared to Model 6, after the inclusion of each interaction term. A significant change in R 2 or chisquare suggests that the inclusion of an interaction term was a significant improvement over Model 6, the baseline model.
In Table 2 , the three interactions terms introduced, respectively, in Models 7, 8, and 9 were signed as predicted, and each corresponding change in R 2 was significant. Specifically, the significant and positive sign of the interaction term of Chinese parent age and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness in Model 7 (p < .10) suggests that the sales growth rate of an IJV improves when its local parent is relatively old-and when the IJV operates in the same industry as this local parent-as predicted in Hypothesis 5. The positive sign of the interaction term of Chinese parent size and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness in Model 8 (p < .05) confirms the prediction of Hypothesis 6 that the size of the local parent further enhances IJV growth when the IJV is industry related to the local parent. Last, the negative sign of the interaction term of Japanese parent-IJV relatedness and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness in Model 9 (p < .05) confirms that dual-industry relatedness to both parents depresses sales growth, supporting Hypothesis 7.
In Table 3 , however, only Model 9 had a significant incremental chi-square. The value of the coefficient estimate of the interaction term of Japanese parent-IJV relatedness and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness in Model 9 was larger than 1 and significant (p < .05), indicating that the survival rate of an IJV falls when the IJV is related to both the Japanese and Chinese parents. Taken together, Hypotheses 5 and 6 received partial support, whereas Hypothesis 7 received full support.
In the final step, we entered all the independent variables and their interaction terms in Model 10. In Tables 2 and 3 , the signs and significance levels of the interaction terms remained largely unchanged from Models 7, 8, and 9, proving the consistency and stability of previously reported results.
To gain further insights into the significant interaction terms, we plotted Figures 1 through 4 for projected sales growth and expected probabilities of IJV exit in Models 7, 8, and 9 based on the significant coefficients of the four independent variables. Specifically, the plots were made for varying values of the independent variables in the interaction terms while holding all the other variables at their mean values.
We also conducted robustness checks on both dependent variables. On IJV sales growth, we ran regressions on an alternative operationalization of sales growth, average sales growth (sales differentials divided by the number of years). The regression results on average sales growth were very consistent with those reported in Table 2 on compound annual sales growth rate. For IJV survival, we estimated additional model specifications such as logistic regression and Cox proportional hazard models. The results were very similar for the different model .17
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F-statistics 3.65*** 3.77*** 3.61*** 3.74*** 3.94*** 3.95*** 3.99*** 4.12*** 4.08*** 4.22*** specifications. For our key independent variables-Japanese parent-IJV relatedness and Chinese parent-IJV relatedness-we constructed alternative measures using two-digit SICs to define relatedness between parents and IJVs. The results with these alternative measures remained the same, although somewhat less significant when compared with three-digit SIC relatedness measures.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our study adds to research on legitimacy and IJVs in several ways. First, we showed that a legitimacy perspective is useful in explaining the outcome of an IJV. Although not significant in all models, our two sources of external legitimacy-local parent age and local parent sizehad a positive effect on IJV growth and IJV survival, respectively. The differential results of Chinese parent age and Chinese parent size may illustrate that different sources of legitimacy have differential effects on different dimensions of IJV performance. Age-based external legitimacy makes a difference to venture growth, whereas size-based external legitimacy seems to be crucial for IJV survival. Despite the differences, our results point to the general spillover effect of external legitimacy coming from the local parent.
Likewise, our two sources of internal legitimacy-foreign parent-IJV relatedness and local parent-IJV relatedness-enhanced the chances of IJV growth and survival, although the positive effect of industry relatedness to the Chinese parent on IJV survival was not statistically significant. Taken together, these findings suggest that it is important to consider legitimacy consequences when firms choose partnering and product-diversification strategies in overseas markets. We urge researchers to consider additional factors in the IJV legitimation process to further the application of a legitimacy perspective to the IJV context. Second, the findings regarding the interaction effects suggest that external legitimacy and internal legitimacy are interdependent, rather than independent, factors in IJVs. Our results indicate that industry relatedness of an IJV to its local parent will strengthen the positive effect of the local parent's age and size. This highlights the importance of the simultaneous attainment of both external and internal legitimacy.
Third, our analysis on the interaction effects also points to the negative impact of industry relatedness of an IJV to both foreign and local parents, which may arise from the conflicting legitimacy requirements of these parents. Whereas literature in international management has discussed some implications of internal legitimacy for a subsidiary and its strategies (Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) , we go further by investigating the potential downside of trying to achieve "unified" legitimacy in a complex internal environment such as that of an IJV.
The negative interaction effect on growth and survival depicted here seems to contradict the findings of Luo (2002) . This could be due to the fact that our sample consisted of parent firms from two countries with a relatively large institutional distance, whereas Luo's sample covered parent firms from a mixture of home regions, including Hong Kong and Singapore. The differences in the samples, coupled with the contrasting results between our study and Luo (2002) , seem to suggest that the level of internal conflict when an IJV is related to both parents may be associated with the institutional distance between the host and home countries. Even so, managers need to carefully consider the internal organizational implications of productdiversification strategy in international expansion.
Fourth, the present study is one of the few empirical studies to examine factors leading to IJV survival and growth mainly from a local parent's perspective. Although research in IJVs has emphasized the various advantages of having a local partner (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Buckley & Casson, 1996) , many empirical studies simply equated a local partner to local knowledge or local advantage, which in turn should contribute to IJV success (e.g., Makino & Delios, 1996) . In contrast, this study begins to "decompartmentalize" the broad concept of local advantage and explore the aspects of the local parent that are most relevant to the performance of an IJV from a legitimacy perspective. The significant effects of local parent age and local parent size we found in this study suggest that without such investigation, our understanding of the true contribution of local partners is rather limited. In this sense, the present study may be a good starting point to shift the attention of current research on IJVs from a preoccupation with foreign parent-based competitive advantages or learning benefits (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Lyles & Salk, 1996; Yiu & Makino, 2002) to more locally oriented considerations.
Finally, one of the strengths of this study is its use of both growth and survival as measures of IJV success. Empirical research in strategic management has long been criticized for having a sampling bias toward surviving firms; on the other hand, researchers focusing on jointventure survival/exit have been unable to establish an unequivocal relationship between IJV exit and failure (Yan & Zeng, 1999) . The inclusion of both survival and growth performance in this article, and the consistent results for both of them, may alleviate a major criticism against research in this field.
It is also important to note the limitations of the present study. The most notable of these is the fact that our empirical results were derived from a sample of Japanese IJVs in China; hence the concern that the findings might be country-specific. We believe that our findings are applicable to other countries because all foreign subsidiaries are subject to external and internal legitimation processes (Hillman & Wan, 2005) . However, the level of conflict in the dual internal legitimation processes (argument for Hypothesis 7) is likely to differ as the institutional distance between the host and home countries changes. We expect that as institutional distance decreases, the level of legitimacy conflict will decrease, and relatedness to both parents might have a less negative-or even positive-effect on IJV performance. Therefore, it is important for future studies to use samples from other countries in order to test and extend the generalizability of our findings.
In addition, we examined industry-based relatedness, although there could be other types of relatedness, such as asset-based relatedness, as recommended by Markides and Williamson (1994) . An exploration of other types of relatedness between an IJV and its parents in future studies will enrich our understanding of the relatedness issue. For industry relatedness, we focused on primary industries in our coding of the relatedness measure. Similar measures could be developed for secondary industries. Although we did not have information on secondary industries, it would be useful for future studies to compare the effects of industry relatedness based on primary industries and secondary industries to assess the reliability of our measure.
